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What Are the Benefits of Hosting
a Major League Sports Franchise?
By Jordan Rappaport and Chad Wilkerson
O
ver the last few decades the number of U.S. metropolitan areas
large enough to host a franchise from one of the four major
professional sports leagues has soared. Even as the National
Football League, Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Asso-
ciation, and the National Hockey League have expanded to include
more franchises, demand by metro areas continues to exceed supply. As
a result, metro areas have been forced to compete with each other to
retain and attract franchises.
Large public expenditures on the construction of new sports facilities
have been the main form of this competition. Sports stadiums and are-
nas are extremely expensive. A new football or baseball stadium costs
approximately $325 million; a new basketball or hockey arena costs
approximately $200 million. The public’s share of these costs has aver-
aged $200 million and $100 million, respectively. During the 1990s
more than $6 billion in public funds was spent on construction of sports
stadiums and arenas. Almost $4 billion has already been allocated
toward new facilities scheduled to open by the end of 2004.
The large public spending on sports facilities has been controversial.
Usually these costly projects are justified by claims that hosting a sports
franchise spurs local economic development by creating numerous new
jobs and boosting local tax revenue. However, independent economic
studies suggest that taxpayers may not be getting such a good deal. In
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by a sports franchise, these studies overwhelmingly find that the bene-
fits are much smaller than the outlay of public funds.
Does this mean that public funding of sports franchises is not justi-
fied? Perhaps not. An important element missing in the debate is the
impact of a sports franchise on a metro area’s quality of life. While diffi-
cult to measure, the contribution of a sports franchise to quality of life
may exceed more traditional job creation and tax revenue benefits. If so,
when quality-of-life benefits are included in the calculation, public spend-
ing may not appear to be such a bad investment for some metro areas.
The first section of this article reviews the current rush by metro
areas to build sports facilities and lays out the arguments both in favor
of and against using public funds to do so. The second section shows
why the job creation and tax revenue benefits from hosting a major
league franchise fall far short of typical public outlays on constructing a
new sports facility. The third section argues that the large quality-of-life
benefits associated with hosting a major league team may justify the
public outlays.
I. THE DEBATE ON PUBLIC FINANCING
FOR SPORTS STADIUMS
More than half the U.S. population lives in one of the 38 metro
areas that host one or more teams from the four major professional
sports leagues. And millions more live in rapidly growing metro areas
with populations large enough to make them a potentially attractive
place to locate a team. With demand for hosting major league teams
exceeding supply, both current and potential host metro areas have been
forced to compete to retain and attract franchises. Doing so almost
always requires allocating large public expenditures to the construction
of sports stadiums and arenas. 
This section documents the scope and magnitude of public spend-
ing on professional sports franchises. It then summarizes the claims
made to justify such spending as well as the critique of these claims by
independent economists. 
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The National Football League (NFL), Major League Baseball
(MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the National
Hockey League (NHL) are the four most widely followed professional
sports leagues in the United States. Of the 121 teams in these four
leagues, 111 play in 92 stadiums and arenas in 38 U.S. metro areas
(Appendix 1). The remaining ten teams play in eight stadiums in six
different Canadian metro areas.
Since 1994, more than $8 billion has been spent constructing new
stadiums to host major league teams. Another $1 billion has been spent
on major renovations of existing stadiums. While a few of the stadiums
were financed privately, most received large contributions from local
and state governments. Public spending on these new and renovated
stadiums has totaled $5.4 billion. An additional $3.7 billion in public
funds has already been allocated toward the construction of stadiums
and arenas scheduled to open by the end of 2004. As a result of all this
spending, by 2004 more than two-thirds of the 111 major league teams
in the United States will be playing in venues that either opened or
were heavily renovated in the previous ten years.
Sports stadiums and arenas are expensive. For the 17 football and
baseball stadiums built since 1994, the average public contribution has
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Table 1
STADIUM AND ARENA OPENINGS, 1994–2004
Number of Avg. cost Avg. public Public cost as
facilities ($mil) cost ($mil) percent of total
1994-2000 new
MLB/NFL 17 286 188 66
NBA/NHL 19 185 84 45
1994-2000 major renovations*
MLB/NFL 6 110 88 82
NBA/NHL 2 114 98 86
2001-04 new†
MLB/NFL 15 366 230 63
NBA/NHL 3 225 114 51
* Renovation of at least $60 million
† Facilities approved by January 1, 2001
Source: Sports Facility Reports (National Sports Law Institute)
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been $188 million, or 66 percent of the total cost (Table 1). For the 19
basketball and hockey arenas built during the same period, the average
public share has been $84 million, or 45 percent of the total. The aver-
age public contribution toward stadiums and arenas currently under
construction is even higher: $230 million for baseball and football stadi-
ums (63 percent of the total), and $114 million for basketball and
hockey arenas (51 percent of the total). Appendix 2 shows public con-
tributions for individual stadium and arena projects. 
To finance their contributions toward stadium and arena projects,
local and state governments issue bonds. Such bonds are usually paid off
through various sorts of taxes enacted especially for this purpose. Sales
taxes directed at tourists (for example, on hotel rooms, rental cars, and
convention space) have been an especially popular method used to repay
stadium bonds. Also common are general sales taxes that can apply
across multiple counties or only in the county or municipality where the
stadium is located. Other means of repaying stadium bonds in recent
years have included gate taxes (surcharges on tickets to events at the
sports facilities), state lottery proceeds, taxes on businesses in specially
designated districts, and local and state government general funds.
Justifying public spending on sports facilities 
Supporters of using public expenditures to finance the construction
of sports facilities argue that hosting a major league franchise helps spur
economic development. Impact studies commissioned by stadium pro-
ponents attempt to quantify how hosting a team affects a variety of
local economic indicators such as output, personal income, jobs, and tax
revenue. Stadium advocates suggest that increases in these indicators
justify the large public outlays on sports facilities.
Table 2 contains a representative sample of benefit claims made in
recent stadium impact studies. A 1996 study, for instance, argued that
the NFL Seahawks in their former stadium increased total Seattle
annual output by $69 million, increased total Seattle annual personal
income by $41 million, created 1,264 Seattle jobs, and raised $3.3 mil-
lion in state and local taxes per year. Impact studies also often label the
expenditures and jobs associated with the construction phase of stadium
projects as economic benefits. For instance, a 1996 study supporting the
public financing of separate new sports stadiums for Cincinnati’s NFL
Bengals and MLB Reds suggests that the construction of these two sta-






































CLAIMED BENEFITS BY PRO-STADIUM IMPACT STUDIES
Annual Annual Total
economic personal State/local impact of
Year of impact earnings Permanent taxes construction Construction
study Metro area Team (league) ($mil) ($mil) jobs created ($mil) ($mil) jobs created
1996 Seattle Seahawks (NFL)* 69 41 1,264 3.3 – –
1996 Cincinnati Bengals (NFL)—current stadium* 77 24 1,785 1.4†† – –
Bengals (NFL)—new stadium* 92 28 2,134 1.8†† 1,100‡ 18,461‡
Reds (MLB)—current stadium* 158 50 3,742 3.0†† – –
Reds (MLB)—new stadium* 192 59 4,474 3.7†† 1,100‡ 18,461‡
1998 Phoenix Diamondbacks (MLB) 319 – 4,110 14.9 694 4,626
1998 Hartford Patriots (NFL)† 171 71 2,757 15.6 – –
1999 Boston Red Sox (MLB)—current stadium* 120 – 1,597 – – –
Red Sox (MLB)—new stadium* 186 – 2,629 – 492 4,769
1999 Wash/Balt Ravens (NFL) 202 96 2,772 11.6 – –
1999 San Antonio Spurs (NBA) 77 43 – 3.3†† 372 –
2000 Green Bay Packers (NFL) 144 89 1,620 9.6 – –
2000 Houston Rockets (NBA) 187 91 2,400 13.0 – –
2001 Kansas City Chiefs (NFL) & Royals (MLB) 328 218 4,418 19.8 – –
* Impacts due only to spending from out-of-area residents
† The Patriots play in the Boston MSA, but proposed moving to Hartford in 1998. Impacts are projections for 2001
†† Local tax revenues only
‡ Total for both Cincinnati stadiums
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diums would generate $1.1 billion in economic activity for the Cincin-
nati metro area and create 18,461 temporary jobs.
These impact studies that justify stadium projects can be subject to a
number of criticisms. Many of the studies look at only the positive effects
of hosting a major league franchise. Taking account of negative effects
such as offsetting job losses, however, would produce much lower esti-
mates of the net impact on local economic development. Moreover, the
impact studies almost always fail to measure benefits in a form that can
be compared with public outlays. While increases in output, increases in
personal income, and job creation all measure increases in underlying
economic activity, how should a metro area value these increases?
In response to the shortcomings of such impact studies, independ-
ent economists have attempted to measure the effect of professional
sports teams on metro areas in a number of ways. One method is to
compare growth rates of metro areas with and without professional
teams, after controlling for other variables. For example, in a study of
the growth of per capita personal income in 48 metro areas from 1958
to 1987, Baade (1994) found no significant difference between metro
areas with major league teams and those without. In a study of 46
metro areas from 1990 to 1994, Walden actually found a negative rela-
tionship between economic activity and the presence of a sports team.
A second way of measuring the impact of teams is to examine the
subsequent growth of cities that acquire new teams. Baade and Sander-
son did this for ten metro areas that obtained new franchises between
1958 and 1993 and found no significant increases in employment or
output. Results from Coates and Humphreys showed that per capita
income fell when metro areas added teams.
Still another approach to measuring the impact of professional
sports teams is to analyze the specific economic activity generated by
specific teams in specific locations. For example, Hamilton and Kahn
measured the annual returns to Maryland residents from Baltimore’s
NFL Ravens at approximately $1 million, compared to a $14 million
annual public cost for their new stadium. Similarly, Baade (1997) meas-
ured the annual returns to Washington state residents from Seattle’s
MLB Mariners at between $3.8 and $5.1 million, compared to a $28
million annual public cost for their new stadium.
Regardless of method, none of the academic studies has so far been
able to find significant economic development benefits sufficient to jus-
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tify the large public outlays. As Siegfried and Zimbalist concluded in a
recent survey of the economics of sports facilities,
Few fields of empirical economic research offer virtual unanimity of findings. Yet,
independent work on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly
found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between sports
facility construction and economic development.
Similarly, Noll and Zimbalist introduced a collection of 14 essays on
the economics of sports stadiums by stating, “The overriding conclusion
of this discussion is that the economic case for publicly financed stadi-
ums cannot credibly rest on the benefits to local business, as measured
by jobs, income, and investment.”
So which view is correct? Do sports teams promote economic devel-
opment as claimed by the impact studies? Or are such economic devel-
opment benefits illusory as suggested by the independent economists?
The next section examines whether the economic development benefits
from hosting a major league franchise justify typical public outlays on
sports stadiums and arenas.
II. MEASURING JOB CREATION
AND TAX REVENUE BENEFITS
To measure the benefits associated with hosting a professional
sports team, both stadium proponents and their critics focus on the
increased economic activity and additional tax revenue that may be
generated by a team’s presence. The most common measure of eco-
nomic activity is the creation of new jobs. Correctly measuring the ben-
efit from job creation requires both accurately accounting for the net
number of new jobs associated with a team’s presence along with valu-
ing the benefit of these jobs to the host metro area. Increased tax rev-
enue resulting from the presence of the professional sports team arises
from sales taxes and income taxes. Estimates of the combined benefits
from net job creation and increased tax revenue fall considerably short
of typical public outlays on new sports stadiums and arenas.
Measuring job creation benefits
Net job creation is a relatively good measure of the possible increase
in economic activity associated with hosting a professional sports team.
Estimated net job creation can be explicitly valued in terms of its bene-
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fit to a metro area’s existing residents. Such an approach provides an
estimate of benefits that can be directly compared with the public out-
lay costs while avoiding double counting that may arise from other
methods. A possible limitation of this approach is that an increase in
economic activity may benefit a metro area’s existing residents even
without any net job creation—for instance, if hosting a team causes
everyone’s wages to increase. However, the findings in numerous inde-
pendent studies suggest that using net job creation to measure eco-
nomic activity does not miss any large benefits. 
Estimating net job creation. To estimate the number of jobs created
from hosting a professional sports team, it is necessary to distinguish
between gross and net job creation. Gross job creation is the number of
jobs that can be observably linked to the presence of a sports team. Such
observable jobs are created mainly within the stadium itself and at
nearby businesses catering to people who attend sports events. But the
presence of a professional sports team also creates job losses, because
individuals who spend money to attend sports events have less to spend
at businesses elsewhere in the host metro area. Less spending results in
job losses. And benefits generally arise only from a net increase in jobs.1
Gross jobs created at a sports stadium include the players and other
team employees; stadium management, maintenance, and support
staff; and the various vendors selling goods at stadium events. Gross
jobs created at nearby stadium businesses arise from the before-game
and after-game spending of people attending sports events. Depending
on the specific design and location of a sports stadium, such spending
may support a number of local businesses, such as parking lots, restau-
rants, nightclubs, and souvenir shops. Some additional tourism-related
jobs that can be linked to the presence of a sports team may also be cre-
ated further away from stadiums. These arise from the spending of peo-
ple who visit a host metro area to attend a sports event—for instance, at
hotels and restaurants located throughout the metro area.2
Both stadium and nearby-stadium job creation may be offset by job
losses throughout a host metro area. Such job losses must be subtracted
from the above job gains to obtain an estimate of net job creation. In
particular, economic research shows that people’s total spending on
entertainment is not affected by the presence of a professional sports
team. For example, the more people spend on attending sports events,
the less they may spend on movies and restaurants (Baade and Sander-
son). Similarly, the more people spend at restaurants and nightclubs
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located near a stadium, the less they may spend at restaurants and
nightclubs located elsewhere. Because the job losses from lower spend-
ing are spread across a large number of businesses and a wide geo-
graphic area, they usually cannot be observably linked to the presence
of a sports team. 
In addition to observable gross jobs, hosting a professional sports
team also creates unobservable “local multiplier” jobs. These jobs arise
from changes in local spending due to gross job creation and the offset-
ting job losses. For example, local spending by team players supports
jobs across a range of local service industries, including at restaurants,
nightclubs, and retail stores. Hence the total number of jobs created in
a host metro area is some multiple of the observable number of jobs cre-
ated. Similarly, the reduced local spending of people who lose jobs
causes additional, again unobservable, job losses. Hence the total num-
ber of jobs lost is some multiple of the “initial” (also unobservable) num-
ber of jobs lost.3
Because local multiplier jobs cannot be easily linked to a sports
team’s presence, the size of the local multiplier is controversial. Esti-
mates of total job creation in the stadium impact studies use local mul-
tipliers as high as 2.5. In other words, these studies assume that 2.5
total jobs are created for each initial observable job created from hosting
a sports team. In contrast, the independent economic studies suggest
that the appropriate local multiplier to apply to the gross jobs created
from hosting a sports team is probably no more than 1.25 (Hamilton
and Kahn; Siegfried and Zimbalist). The lower local multipliers used by
the independent studies appear more reasonable because a large portion
of local spending goes to purchase goods and services produced outside
the host metro area. In addition, many professional sports players reside
outside the metro area in which they play, either during the off-season
or following retirement.
Taking explicit account of job losses and using estimates of the local
multiplier from independent studies suggest that the net number of
jobs created from hosting a professional sports team is quite low. It is
almost certainly less than 1,000 and likely to be much closer to zero.
For example, the methodology and numbers reported in Hamilton and
Kahn suggest that Baltimore’s hosting of the Orioles baseball team has
created just 770 jobs in the Baltimore metro area. Statistical analysis
reported in Baade and Sanderson found evidence of positive net job cre-
ation in only three of ten metro areas examined; their highest estimate
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of the number of net jobs created from hosting a sports team was 356
(associated with the Kansas City Royals). Surveying the economics liter-
ature, Siegfried and Zimbalist concluded that hosting a sports team
might actually be associated with net job destruction rather than net
job creation.4
Valuing the benefits from net job creation. To measure the benefit from
increased economic activity, it is not enough just to estimate the net
number of jobs created. It is also necessary to value explicitly the bene-
fit of these jobs to the metro area. 
It is important to realize that a metro area’s existing residents may
not benefit at all from net job creation. Consider the case of metro area
residents who already have high paying jobs which they enjoy. How do
they benefit from more jobs in a metro area? On the positive side, prop-
erty prices are likely to rise and local governments may be able to raise
revenues from a larger tax base, in turn allowing for lower tax rates. On
the negative side, a rise in property prices could make housing less
affordable, and traffic and other sorts of congestion may increase. For
some existing residents, the net result may be that they are hurt rather
than helped by net job creation.5
Whether and how much a metro area benefits from net job creation
is an empirical question that a number of economists have attempted to
answer. In particular, statistical techniques have been used to look at the
correlations across metro areas among population, employment, wages,
and house values. For a given increase in population and employment,
benefits accrue through associated rises in wages or house values. For
people who do not own their homes, net benefits are likely be negligible
as any rise in wages is offset by the higher cost of housing. But for resi-
dents who already own a home, there is no offset and so benefits may be
positive.
Using such techniques, economists have estimated metro area ben-
efits to range from $0 to $1,500 per net job created (Rosen; Roback;
Gyourko and Tracy; and Hamilton and Kahn).6 At one extreme, if the
benefit per net job created is indeed zero, metro areas will not benefit at
all from any possible net job creation from hosting a professional sports
team. At the other extreme, even if the benefit per net job created is at
its upper bound estimate of $1,500, the total benefit to a metro area
from any net jobs created will be far smaller than the total of the associ-
ated salaries.
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Valuing the net job creation benefit from a team requires combin-
ing the above estimates of the number of net jobs created with the value
of these jobs to the host metro area (Table 3). Using the lower and
upper bound estimates, respectively, values the net job creation benefit
at $0 and $1.5 million per year. Using the midpoints from each of these
ranges as a baseline values the net job creation benefit at $375,000 per
year (500 jobs times $750 per job). 
Measuring tax revenue benefits
The second main source of benefits on which both stadium advo-
cates and independent economists focus is the increased tax revenues
that may arise from hosting a team. Fans’ spending before, during, and
after games is likely to be subject to local and state sales taxes. And the
income accruing to any net increase in jobs is often subject to local and
state income taxes. 
Estimating imported sales tax revenue. The main way in which
increased sales tax revenue benefits a host metro area is if it is paid by
nonlocal residents. Nonlocal sports fans visiting to attend games pay
sales taxes on all local purchases before, during, and after games. Such
spending “imports” tax revenue, which in the absence of a professional
sports team would have accrued to governments outside the host metro
area. Imported sales tax revenue benefits the host metro area by reduc-
ing the amount of taxes that need to be raised from local residents.7
Estimating the imported sales tax revenues associated with hosting
a team is straightforward. To do so, first the number of nonlocal fans
who visit to attend sports games must be estimated. This estimate is
then multiplied by the fans’ estimated average spending before, during,
and after games. Finally, this latter result must be multiplied by the rel-
Table 3
ESTIMATES OF NET JOB CREATION
FROM HOSTING A PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAM
Number of net jobs created 0 to 1,000
Benefit per net job created $0 to $1,500
Baseline annual benefit (500 jobs x $750 benefit per job) $375,000
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on estimates from Hamilton and Kahn, Baade and Sanderson,
Gyourko and Tracy, Rosen, and Roback
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evant local sales tax rate. The difficult part, of course, is estimating the
number of visitors and how much they spend on average. Among the
four major professional sports leagues, specifics such as ticket prices,
average attendance, and the number of home games per season vary
enough to require separate estimates. And regardless of league, it is
necessary to distinguish nonlocal sports fans who visit for the purpose of
attending a game from nonlocal visitors who happen to attend a game. 
Table 4 derives the estimated imported sales tax benefit from hosting
a team from each of the four major sports leagues. The listed percentages
of nonlocal visiting fans are toward the high end of estimates from a
number of impact and economic studies.8 For calculating the imported
sales tax revenue benefit attributable to hosting a sports team, what
matters is not the number of nonlocal residents who attend games but
rather the number of nonlocal residents whose visits are explicitly moti-
vated by the presence of a team. The distinction is crucial. Nonlocal res-
idents who attend games may be visiting the host metro area for
non-game-related reasons such as business or family. If so, their spending
at games most likely represents a shifting away from spending on other
forms of local entertainment and hence the associated imported tax rev-
enues should not be attributed to the presence of the sports team.9
Average spending by visiting sports fans is estimated to range from
$63 for MLB games to $99 for NBA games. The concession portion of
average spending is based on the purchase of a representative bundle of
food, merchandise, and parking at the average 2000 season price in the
respective league (FOXSports.com). The out-of-stadium portion of
average spending is based on a survey of fans attending Baltimore Ori-
oles games in 1992, converted to 2000 dollars (Hamilton and Kahn).
The imported tax revenue from a given amount of visitors’ spend-
ing obviously depends on the applicable rate of sales tax. Assuming an
extremely high local sales tax rate of 5 percent suggests that hosting a
sports team imports from $696,000 per year for an NHL team to
$1,537,000 per year for an MLB team. At a more typical local sales tax
rate of 2 percent, imported sales tax revenues for the four types of teams
range from just $278,400 per year for an NHL team to $614,800 per
year for an MLB team.10
Estimating income tax revenue. Many of the localities in which profes-
sional sports teams play levy local income taxes. If so, the income tax
revenue on salaries due to any net job creation is imported in the sense
that in the absence of a professional sports team, it would be paid to
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other localities. Such imported income tax revenue does not necessarily
benefit the host metro area since at least in part it goes to cover any
additional costs in providing municipal services to accommodate the
growth in employment and population.11
Nevertheless, because player salaries are extremely high, the associ-
ated income taxes are likely to far exceed the marginal cost of any
municipal services used by players. This is especially so since many play-
ers reside outside the host metro area for a significant portion of the
year. Moreover, because they tend to be young, few players have chil-
dren in local public schools. Income taxes on the relatively high salaries
of a team’s general manager and head coach are also likely to exceed the
marginal cost of the additional municipal services these individuals use.
Table 5 derives the estimated imported income tax benefit from host-
ing a team from each of the four major sports leagues. Applying a 2 per-
cent income tax rate to the estimated team payrolls suggests that
Table 4
ESTIMATES OF IMPORTED SALES TAX REVENUE
PER TEAM, 2000 SEASON
NFL MLB NBA NHL
Number of home games 10 81 44 44
(including preseason)
Average attendance 66,100 30,125 16,800 16,300
(based on all teams for 2000 season)
Nonlocal fans 35% 20% 20% 20%
Number of nonlocal fans per season 231,350 488,025 147,840 143,440
Average ticket price $46 $15 $48 $46
Average concessions/parking $19 $15 $18 $18
Average out-of-stadium
spending by non-MSA visiting fans $33 $33 $33 $33
Average per visit spending
by non-MSA fans $98 $63 $99 $97
Total annual spending
by visiting non-MSA fans $22,672,000 $30,746,000 $14,636,000 $13,914,000
Annual sales tax revenues
with a 5% local sales tax rate $1,134,000 $1,537,000 $732,000 $696,000
Sources: FOXSports.com; authors’ calculations based on estimates from impact and
independent economic studies
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increased local income taxes range from $868,000 per year for NHL
teams to $1.4 million per year for NFL teams. The assumed 2 percent
local income tax rate is toward the high end of the rate at which local gov-
ernments tax income. Indeed, many professional teams play in metro
areas whose local governments do not levy income taxes. On the other
hand, many state governments tax income at higher than a 2 percent
rate. Using the highest combined state and local income tax rate from the
metro areas that host teams (10.6 percent for New York City) establishes
an upper bound on the imported annual income tax benefit ranging from
$4.6 million for an NHL team to $7.5 million for an NFL team.
Comparing job creation and tax revenue benefits to public outlays
How do benefits of estimated job creation and tax revenue compare
with typical public outlays on sports facilities? Adding together the
annual estimated benefit values of the net job creation, imported sales
taxes, and increased income taxes yields baseline estimates of the value
of hosting a franchise ranging from $1.9 million per year for an NHL
team to $2.9 million per year for an NFL team (Table 6).
A last necessary step toward the goal of comparing benefits and
costs is to convert benefits quantified on an annual basis into benefits
quantified on a net present value basis. The question is, how much
should a metro area be willing to spend for each dollar of annual bene-
fits associated with hosting a franchise? Calculating the answer is
straightforward. Assuming that metro areas can borrow (by issuing
municipal bonds) at a 6 percent interest rate and that the proceeds are
used to purchase an annual stream of benefits starting one year in the
future and lasting for 30 years (a reasonable estimate for the life of a
sports stadium), it follows that each $1 of annual benefits is worth
$13.76 to the metro area.12
On a net present value basis, the estimated value of the combined
jobs and tax benefits from a franchise range from $26.7 million for an
NHL team to $40.3 million for an NFL team (Table 6). Such values fall
far short of typical public outlays on sports facilities. The average public
outlay on new baseball and football stadiums completed between 1994
and 2000 was $188 million. Thus, for most sports stadium projects,
costs exceeded the above estimated benefits by well over $100 million.
The average public outlay on new basketball and hockey arenas com-
pleted over the same period was $84 million. Thus, for most sports
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arena projects, costs exceeded the above estimated benefits by well over
$50 million. The amount by which public costs exceed estimated jobs
and tax benefits is even higher for the sports stadiums and arenas cur-
rently under construction.
Table 5
ESTIMATES OF INCOME TAX REVENUE PER TEAM,
2000 SEASON
NFL MLB NBA NHL
Number of players on rosters 53 25 15 23
Average salary,
in millions of dollars 1.3 1.9 3.2 1.8
Head coach + general manager 2 2 2 2
Average salary,
in millions of dollars 1 1 1 1
Total player, head coach,
and general manager payroll,
in millions of dollars 70.9 49.5 50.0 43.4
Annual income tax revenues
with a 2% local income tax,
in millions of dollars 1.4 1.0 1.0 .9
Source: FOXSports.com; authors’ calculations
Table 6
ESTIMATES OF JOBS AND TAX BENEFITS, 2000 SEASON
NFL MLB NBA NHL
Baseline annual benefit value
(% of total job + tax benefit):
Net job creation benefit $375,000 $375,000 $375,000 $375,000
(12.8%) (12.9%) (17.8%) (19.3%)
Imported sales taxes benefit $1,134,000 $1,537,000 $732,000 $696,000
(38.7%) (53.0%) (34.7%) (35.9%)
Increased income taxes benefit $1,418,000 $990,000 $1,000,000 $868,000
(48.4%) (34.1%) (47.5%) (44.8%)
Total annual benefit value $2,927,000 $2,902,000 $2,107,000 $1,939,000
Net present value
of jobs and tax benefits
from hosting a team for 30 years
using 6% interest rate
(annual benefit times 13.76) $40,275,520 $39,931,520 $28,992,320 $26,680,640
Source: Authors’ calculations
Rappaport/Wilkerson.qxd  4/25/01  3:14 PM  Page 6970 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
If anything, the baseline values estimated above likely overstate
rather than understate the benefits they measure. As discussed, there is
much doubt that hosting a professional sports team creates any jobs.
Moreover, many host metro areas tax spending at a rate lower than the
assumed 5 percent baseline. And, many do not tax income at all. As a
result, it is reasonable to believe that the net present value of the jobs
and tax benefits may be no more than $5 million from hosting an NBA
or NHL team and no more than $10 million from hosting an NFL or
MLB team. Even using the upper-bound estimates from the analysis
above suggests that the public outlays on current sports facility projects
far exceed any associated jobs and tax benefits.
The bottom line, then, is that the benefit to a host metro area from
increased economic activity as measured by net job creation and
increased tax revenues appears to fall far short of the public outlays typ-
ically needed to retain and attract professional sports teams. Neverthe-
less, metro areas continue to approve ever-larger public outlays on new
sports facility construction. If such public outlays represent good invest-
ments, there must be some other large benefit from hosting a team that
the above analysis is not measuring. The next section explores whether
a professional sports team’s contribution to a host area’s quality of life
may be exactly such a benefit.
III. QUALITY-OF-LIFE BENEFITS
FROM HOSTING A MAJOR LEAGUE FRANCHISE
The presence of a major league sports franchise can help make a
metro area an attractive place to live. Nearly all analyses of the benefits
from hosting professional sports teams recognize this contribution to a
metro area’s quality of life. But because quality-of-life benefits are diffi-
cult to quantify, stadium proponents and critics usually pay them little
attention beyond such acknowledgment. 
The term “quality of life” used in this article is meant to capture the
satisfaction, or happiness, residents derive from shared metro area
attributes. Examples of shared attributes include pleasant weather, sce-
nic vistas, and natural recreational opportunities. Of course, residents’
happiness also depends on their individual circumstances, such as hav-
ing a good job and living in a nice house.
This section discusses how the presence of a major league franchise
contributes to the quality of life of a host metro area’s residents. Three
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possible ways of valuing this benefit are presented. Together they sug-
gest that hosting a major league franchise contributes substantially to
quality of life and perhaps justifies public outlays on sports stadiums
and arenas.
How hosting a professional sports team contributes to quality of life 
Professional sports teams contribute to a metro area’s quality of life
primarily by increasing the happiness of sports fans. The most visible
source of fan happiness comes from attending home games. However,
only part of this happiness actually counts as a quality-of-life benefit
attributable to hosting a team. This is because fans must pay to attend
games. In the absence of a professional sports team, fans could instead
use what they paid for game admissions on other sources of happiness,
such as watching a movie or traveling to a different metro area to
attend a game.
Formally, the quality-of-life benefit to a particular fan who attends a
sports game is the amount above the admission price they would have
been willing to spend to attend the game. For instance, if someone is
willing to spend $30 to attend a game that only costs $20, they receive
a $10 quality-of-life benefit. Adding up the individual quality-of-life
benefits of all residents who attend games yields the total metro area’s
quality-of-life benefit from game attendance.13
A second source of happiness for fans comes from rooting for a team
more generally, independent of actually attending games in person.
Fans watch games on television, listen to them on the radio, and read
about them in local newspapers. Games serve as an occasion for parties
and barbecues. Teams’ performance is the subject of long discussions
among friends. And second-guessing team decisions is the subject of
nearly continuous banter on local talk radio. 
It is also possible that hosting a franchise increases the happiness of
all metro area residents, regardless of their being sports fans. Home
games and rooting for a sports team provide for shared community
experiences. And hosting a sports team may increase civic pride—for
instance, by contributing to a sense that one lives in a “world class” city. 
On the other hand, hosting a team may also decrease the happiness
of some metro area residents. Home games impose traffic and conges-
tion in the vicinity of sports facilities. And television viewers face inter-
ruption of their favorite syndicated shows by local game broadcasts.
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Such possible negative contributions must be subtracted from positive
contributions in valuing the net contribution to quality of life from
hosting a team.
Valuing quality-of-life benefits 
Valuing the happiness metro area residents derive from the presence
of a major league team is extremely difficult. A person’s happiness from
attending a game or from watching one on television is not observable.
Nevertheless, there are several possible approaches to valuing quality-of-
life benefits. A first approach is to ask a sample of metro area residents
how much they would be willing to pay to retain or attract a team. A
second approach uses variations in metro area wages and house prices to
implicitly value quality-of-life attributes that may be similar in magni-
tude to hosting a major league franchise. A third approach looks at the
actions of metro areas that have lost sports franchises and so may have
the best information on the quality-of-life benefits from hosting a team. 
Surveying residents. The most direct approach to valuing the quality-
of-life benefits from hosting a team is to ask local residents how much
they would be willing to pay to keep their team from moving. 
In the only major study of this kind, Pittsburgh metro area residents
were asked during the winter of 2000, “What is the most you would be
willing to pay out of your own household budget each year in higher city
taxes to keep the Penguins in Pittsburgh?” (Johnson, Groothuis, and
Whitehead). The responses implicitly valued the quality-of-life benefits
from hosting the NHL Penguins at somewhere between $0.83 to $2.30
per Pittsburgh metro area resident per year. Given metro Pittsburgh’s
population of 2.4 million and converting to a net present value basis
using a 6 percent interest rate, as described in the previous section, the
value of hosting the Penguins for 30 years is estimated to fall somewhere
in the range of $26.9 million to $74.7 million.
Note that the lower-bound estimate of the quality-of-life value of
hosting the Penguins is nearly the same as the baseline estimate of the
job creation and tax benefit value of doing so. The upper-bound esti-
mate of the quality-of-life value of hosting the Penguins begins to
approach the $84 million average public contribution to NBA/NHL
sports arenas completed between 1994 and 2000.
Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that the quality-of-life
benefits to Pittsburgh from hosting the Penguins may be low relative to
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such benefits associated with other major league teams. First, the qual-
ity-of-life benefits from hosting an NHL team are probably the lowest
of the four leagues considered in this article. For instance, only 15 of the
24 NHL teams currently have local network television contracts. And
when NHL games are broadcast, their ratings tend to be less than half
those for MLB games (SportsBusiness Journal). Second, Pittsburgh also
hosts the NFL Steelers and the MLB Pirates. So even if it were to lose
the Penguins, Pittsburgh would still host two major league teams. Eco-
nomic theory argues that the additional benefit of something decreases
the more you have of it. Third, at the time the survey was conducted,
the Penguins organization was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
Whatever problems caused the Penguins’ financial difficulties may also
have lowered the team’s contribution to Pittsburgh’s quality of life.
Fourth, as will be argued below, it may be that only by losing a team do
metro area residents come to accurately value the team’s contribution to
quality of life.14
Comparing to quality-of-life valuations of other attributes. The second
approach to valuing the quality-of-life contribution from hosting a team
considers the valuations of other attributes that also contribute to qual-
ity of life. For instance, the quality-of-life net present value associated
with one extra day per year of pleasant weather for 30 years turns out to
be similar in magnitude to many of the recent public outlays on sta-
dium projects. So if the contribution to quality of life from hosting a
major league team is at least as great as the contribution from one extra
day per year of pleasant weather, then the public outlays on sports sta-
diums and arenas may be justified.
The quality-of-life benefits of certain attributes that naturally differ
across metro areas, such as the weather, can be measured by variations
in wages and house prices. All else equal, metro areas with attributes
that positively contribute to residents’ happiness attract population
inflows. This puts downward pressure on local wages and upward pres-
sure on local house prices as people who move in try to find jobs and
housing. The lower wages and higher house prices serve as negative
“compensation” for the high quality of life. Conversely, metro areas that
offer low levels of happiness lose population, putting upward pressure
on local wages and downward pressure on local house prices as firms try
to retain workers and the people who move out vacate housing. The
higher wages and lower house prices serve as positive “compensation”
for the low quality of life.15
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Using data on a large number of individuals and households living in
more than 100 different metro areas, statistical techniques can measure
the variations in wages and house prices that are due to each of several
metro area attributes. The quality-of-life value of a given metro area
attribute can then be calculated as the sum of the lower wages individu-
als are willing to accept and the higher house prices they are willing to
pay to live in an area with such an attribute.16 Table 7 summarizes a few
results from research that estimates such “compensating differentials.”
The quantitative benefits from quality of life are found to be quite
large. For instance, the estimates suggest that the annual value to a
metro area of one extra sunny day per year is between $7 to $12 per
person. So a metro area with two million people should be willing to
pay between $14 million and $24 million per year for the extra annual
sunny day (or roughly between $193 million and $330 million up front
for an average extra sunny day over each of the subsequent 30 years).
Quantitatively similar valuations are estimated for the quality-of-life
benefits of one less rainy day per year and one inch less snow per year.
Unfortunately, this second approach cannot be used directly to
value the quality of life from hosting a major league team. The reason is
that nearly all teams choose to locate in metro areas with high levels of
population and employment. This makes it impossible to distinguish
between the variations in wages and house prices that are due to the
presence of a sports team and those that are due to the high population
and employment.
Nevertheless, the high valuations of the quality-of-life benefits that
flow from geographic attributes such as pleasant weather serve as a use-
ful benchmark for the quality-of-life benefits from hosting a major
league team. In particular, large public outlays to attract and retain a
major league team may make sense if the team’s contribution to the
area’s quality of life is similar in magnitude to that of one extra sunny
day per year (or one less rainy day per year or one inch less snow per
year). Fan willingness to endure extreme weather to attend games at
outdoor stadiums suggests that the positive contribution to happiness
from hosting a professional sports team may exceed such a threshold.
The experience of metro areas that lost teams. A third approach to valu-
ing quality-of-life benefits points to the actions of metro areas that
hosted a major league team that then moved elsewhere. These metro
areas should be among those with the best information on the quality-
of-life benefits from hosting a team since they can compare happiness
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both with and without a team. Subsequent to losing a team, many of
these metro areas were willing to significantly increase the size of their
public outlays on constructing new sports facilities. This willingness
suggests that residents revised upward their estimates of a major league
team’s contribution to their happiness. The resulting success of such
metro areas in attracting replacement teams indicates that quality-of-
life benefits may indeed justify the large public outlays.
Since 1980, only 12 U.S. metro areas have lost major league
teams.17 Six of these lost National Football League teams: Oakland
(1983), Baltimore (1984), St. Louis (1988), Los Angeles (two teams in
1995), Cleveland (1997), and Houston (1997). Four metro areas lost
National Hockey League teams: Atlanta (1980), Denver (1982), Min-
neapolis/St. Paul (1993) and Hartford (1997). And two metro areas lost
National Basketball Association teams: Kansas City (1984) and San
Diego (1984). 
Losing a football team seems clearly to have caused metro area res-
idents to revise upward their estimates of the associated quality-of-life
benefits.18 Of the metro areas that lost NFL teams, all but Los Angeles
subsequently allocated considerably more public financing to attract a
new NFL team than it would have cost to keep their old team. For
example, St. Louis’ NFL Cardinals departed in 1987 after the city
refused to allocate $120 million toward the construction of a new foot-
Table 7
ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL PER PERSON CONTRIBUTION
TO QUALITY OF LIFE
Annual per person
Attribute value, 1999$ Source
Weather: 1 less rainy day per year $12+ Rosen
Weather: 1 extra sunny day per year $ 7 Gyourko and Tracy
$12  Blomquist et al
Weather: 1 inch less snow per year $11 Roback
Pollution: 10 fewer micrograms $ 3 Blomquist et al
suspended particulates per cubic meter air $24 Gyourko and Tracy
Pollution: 1 less Superfund site per county $93 Blomquist et al
Violent crime: 100 fewer violent crimes $ 91 Blomquist et al
per year per 100,000 population $114 Gyourko and Tracy
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ball stadium (Quirk and Fort). Less than three years later, St. Louis vot-
ers approved $280 million in public funds for a new football stadium—
even before they had a team to play in it.19 And two years following the
departure of the NFL Browns, Cleveland allocated $214 million toward
construction of a football stadium for a newly awarded expansion team.
The owner of the former Cleveland Browns commented, “The only
regret I have, to be honest with you, is that if they gave me half of what
they’re doing now, I’d still be in Cleveland” (Meyer). Similarly, Oakland,
Baltimore, and Houston each increased by at least one-third the
amount of public funds they were willing to spend on building new
football stadiums.20
The experience of metro areas that lost NHL and NBA teams has
been more mixed. Minneapolis-St. Paul would probably have needed to
spend only about $17 million to prevent the 1993 departure of its NHL
team (Bremner). But in 1999 it decided to allocate $130 million to
attract a new NHL team. At the same time, Atlanta and Denver man-
aged to endure the loss of their NHL teams for 19 and 13 years, respec-
tively. They were eventually able to attract replacement NHL teams at
what is probably a lower public cost than what would have been
required to prevent the original losses. Hartford has been more aggres-
sive in attempting to attract an NFL team rather than a replacement for
its departed NHL team. And neither Kansas City nor San Diego has
made an extensive effort to replace their NBA teams.21
Taking account of quality-of-life benefits
The previous section’s discussion of the job creation and tax revenue
benefits from hosting a major league franchise suggested that such ben-
efits fall far short of typical public outlays on the construction of new
sports facilities. Can quality-of-life benefits make up the difference? 
Based on results of a survey asking Pittsburgh metro area residents
how much they would be willing to be taxed to keep the NHL Pen-
guins, the answer may be yes. However, caution warns against general-
izing the results from a single survey.
Alternatively, results of economic studies of compensating differen-
tials provide a benchmark in assessing quality-of-life benefits. For
instance, if the contribution to metro area residents’ happiness from
hosting a major league sports franchise is similar in magnitude to that
from an additional day of pleasant weather per year, the net present
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value quality-of-life benefit may indeed approach the magnitude of
recent public outlays on sports facility construction.
Finally, the aggressive bids by metro areas to replace teams that
have departed further supports the view that the overall value to a
metro area from hosting a professional sports team may exceed the asso-
ciated large public expenditures. Of course, this will not always be the
case as is illustrated by the metro areas that have not made extensive
efforts to reattract lost teams. But for those metro areas that have bid
aggressively, this would almost certainly have to be due to a large con-
tribution to residents’ quality of life.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
U.S. metro areas have had to compete with each other to retain and
attract major league sports franchises. The resulting large public outlays
to finance the construction of sports facilities have been quite controver-
sial. Proponents of using public funds to finance stadium construction
argue that the benefits from increased economic activity and increased tax
revenue collection exceed the public outlays. But independent economic
studies universally find such benefits to be much smaller than claimed.
So does it makes sense for metro areas to use public funds to attract
and retain major league sports franchises? The answer is definitely not if
benefits are limited to increases in economic activity and tax revenue
collection. A strong case can be made, however, that the quality-of-life
benefits from hosting a major league team can sometimes justify the
large public outlays associated with doing so.22
Quality-of-life benefits are rarely explicitly included in the debate
on using public funds to attract and retain a major league sports fran-
chise. Acknowledging that the main benefit from hosting a team comes
from improved metro-area quality of life should help to value this con-
tribution. Doing so does not require impact studies. Residents and
elected officials who understand that the benefits of a sports team are
the same sort that flow from parks, zoos, museums, and theater can
decide on their own how much hosting a major league team is worth. 
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Appendix 1
LARGEST U.S. METRO AREAS
AND THEIR MAJOR LEAGUE TEAMS
Size Metro area Pop 2000 MLB NFL NBA NHL Teams Venues Pop/team
1 New York 21,199,865 2 2 2 3 9 6 2,355,541
2 Los Angeles 16,373,645 2 – 2 2 6 4 2,728,941
3 Chicago 9,157,540 2 1 1 1 5 4 1,831,508
4 Washington/Baltimore 7,608,070 1 2 1 1 5 4 1,521,614
5 SF/Oakland/San Jose 7,039,362 2 2 1 1 6 5 1,173,227
6 Philadelphia 6,188,463 1 1 1 1 4 2 1,547,116
7 Boston 5,819,100 1 1 1 1 4 3 1,454,775
8 Detroit 5,456,428 1 1 1 1 4 4 1,364,107
9 Dallas/Fort Worth 5,221,801 1 1 1 1 4 3 1,305,450
10 Houston 4,669,571 1 1 1 – 3 3 1,556,524
11 Atlanta 4,112,198 1 1 1 1 4 3 1,028,050
12 Miami 3,876,380 1 1 1 1 4 3 969,095
13 Seattle 3,554,760 1 1 1 – 3 3 1,184,920
14 Phoenix 3,251,876 1 1 1 1 4 3 812,969
15 Minneapolis/St. Paul 2,968,806 1 1 1 1 4 3 742,202
16 Cleveland 2,945,831 1 1 1 – 3 3 981,944
17 San Diego 2,813,833 1 1 – – 2 1 1,406,917
18 St. Louis 2,603,607 1 1 – 1 3 3 867,869
19 Denver 2,581,506 1 1 1 1 4 3 645,377
20 Tampa 2,395,997 1 1 – 1 3 3 798,666
21 Pittsburgh 2,358,695 1 1 – 1 3 3 786,232
22 Portland 2,265,223 – – 1 – 1 1 2,265,223
23 Cincinnati 1,979,202 1 1 – – 2 1 989,601
24 Sacramento 1,796,857 – – 1 – 1 1 1,796,857
25 Kansas City 1,776,062 1 1 – – 2 2 888,031
26 Milwaukee 1,689,572 1 – 1 – 2 2 844,786
27 Orlando 1,644,561 – – 1 – 1 1 1,644,561
28 Indianapolis 1,607,486 – 1 1 – 2 2 803,743
29 San Antonio 1,592,383 – – 1 – 1 1 1,592,383
30 Norfolk/Va. Beach 1,569,541 – – – – – – –
31 Las Vegas 1,563,282 – – – – – – –
32 Columbus 1,540,157 – – – 1 1 1 1,540,157
33 Charlotte 1,499,293 – 1 1 – 2 2 749,647
34 New Orleans 1,337,726 – 1 – – 1 1 1,337,726
35 Salt Lake City 1,333,914 – – 1 – 1 1 1,333,914
36 Greenboro/Win-Salem 1,251,509 – – – – – – –
37 Austin 1,249,763 – – – – – – –
38 Nashville 1,231,311 – 1 – 1 2 2 615,656
39 Providence 1,188,613 – – – – – – –
40 Raleigh/Durham 1,187,941 – – – 1 1 1 1,187,941
41 Hartford 1,183,110 – – – – – – –
42 Buffalo 1,170,111 – 1 – 1 2 2 585,056
43 Memphis 1,135,614 – – – – – – –
44 West Palm Beach 1,131,184 – – – – – – –
45 Jacksonville 1,100,491 – 1 – – 1 1 1,100,491
155 Green Bay 226,778 – 1 – – 1 1 226,778
U.S. metro areas
with pro sports 147,176,402 28 32 27 24 111 92 1,325,914
Total United States 281,421,906 28 32 27 24 111 92 2,535,332
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Appendix 2
FINANCING OF NEW SPORTS FACILITIES
AND MAJOR RENOVATIONS, 1994–2004
Total Public
cost cost Source of Type of tax used to repay bonds
Metro area, Facility (League) ($mil) ($mil) public funding or other means of public financing
1994–2000 new
Atlanta 235 0 – n/a
Turner Field (MLB)
Atlanta 214 173 County Gate/concession, Hotel/rental-car
Philips Arena (NBA/NHL)
Boston 160 0 – n/a
Fleet Center (NBA/NHL)
Buffalo 123 54 State,County,City Gate/concession
HSBC Arena (NHL)
Charlotte 298 10 City General fund
Ericcson Stadium (NFL)
Chicago 150 11 City General fund
United Center (NBA/NHL)
Cincinnati 452 452 State,County,City Sales
Paul Brown Stadium (NFL)
Cleveland 173 152 County Alcohol/tobacco, Gate/concession
Jacobs Field (MLB)
Cleveland 152 73 State,County Alcohol/tobacco, Capital improvement fund
Gund Arena (NBA)
Cleveland 309 216 County Alcohol/tobacco
Cleveland Browns
Stadium (NFL)
Columbus 150 0 – n/a
Nationwide Arena (NHL)
Dallas/Fort Worth 191 153 City Sales, General fund
Ballpark at Arlington (MLB)
Denver 215 161 Multi-county Sales
Coors Field (MLB)
Denver 165 5 County General fund
Pepsi Center (NBA/NHL)
Detroit 290 145 County Hotel/rental-car, casino revenues
Comerica Park (MLB)
Houston 266 180 County Hotel/rental-car
Enron Field (MLB)
Indianapolis 175 72 City Sales, Capital improvement fund
Conseco Fieldhouse (NBA)
Los Angeles 321 71 City
Staples Center (NBA/NHL)
Miami 212 184 City Hotel/rental-car
National Car Rental
Arena (NHL)
Miami 241 142 City Hotel/rental-car
American Airlines Arena (NBA)
Minneapolis/St. Paul 130 130 State,City Sales
Xcel Energy Center (NHL)
Nashville 144 144 City General fund
Gaylord Entertainment
Center (NHL)
Nashville 292 292 State,City Hotel/rental-car, Gate/concession, General fund
Adelphia Coliseum (NFL)
Philadelphia 206 23 State,City General fund
First Union Center (NBA/NHL)
Phoenix 355 270 County Sales, Gate/concession
BankOne Ballpark (MLB)
Portland 262 200 City Gate/concession, General fund
Rose Garden (NBA)
Raleigh 160 139 State,County Hotel/rental-car, General fund
Raleigh Entertainment/
Sports Arena (NHL)
Seattle 517 393 State,County Sales, Hotel/rental-car, Gate/concession
Safeco Field (MLB)
SF/Oakland/San Jose 306 15 City Special financing district
Pacific Bell Park (MLB)
St. Louis 160 24 City General fund
Savvis Center (NHL)
St. Louis 300 300 State,County,City
TWA Dome (NFL)
Tampa 139 86 State,County,City General fund
Ice Palace (NHL)
Appendix 2 continues on following page
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Appendix 2, continued
Total Public
cost cost Source of Type of tax used to repay bonds
Metro area, Facility (League) ($mil) ($mil) public funding or other means of public financing
Tampa 190 190 City Sales
Raymond James Stadium (NFL)
Washington/Baltimore 251 70 State,City General fund
FedEx Field (NFL)
Washington/Baltimore 260 60 State,City General fund
MCI Center (NBA/NHL)
Washington/Baltimore 229 200 State General fund, Lottery proceeds
PSINet Stadium (NFL)
1994–2000 renovations
Buffalo 63 63 State General fund
Ralph Wilson Stadium (NFL)
Jacksonville 135 122 State,City General fund, Hotel/rental-car, Gate/concession
Alltel Stadium (NFL)
Los Angeles 117 30 City Gate/concession, Hotel/rental-car, General fund
Edison International
Field (MLB)
San Diego 78 60 City General fund
Qualcomm Field (MLB/NFL)
Seattle 107 75 City General fund
Key Arena (NBA)
SF/Oak/SJ 200 200 County,City General fund
Network Associates (MLB/NFL)
SF/Oak/SJ 121 121 County,City General fund
Oakland Arena (NBA)
Tampa 65 51 State,City Hotel/rental-car, Gate/concession, General fund
Tropicana Field (MLB)
2001–2004 new*
Boston 325 70 State General fund
New Patriots stadium (NFL)
Chicago 587 387 City Hotel/rental-car
New Bears stadium (NFL)
Cincinnati 297 224 County Sales
Great American Ballpark (MLB)
Dallas/FW 325 125 City Hotel/rental-car
American Airlines
Arena (NBA/NHL)
Denver 360 270 Multi-county Sales
Invesco Field (NFL)
Detroit 245 125 County Hotel/rental-car, General fund
Ford Field (NFL)
Green Bay 295 169 County Sales
New Lambeau Field (NFL)
Houston 402 287 County Hotel/rental-car
Reliant Stadium (NFL)
Houston 175 70 County Hotel/rental-car, General fund
New Rockets arena (NBA)
Milwaukee 322 232 State,County,City Sales, General fund
Miller Park (MLB)
Philadelphia 642 304 State,City General fund, Gate/concession
New Eagles stadium (NFL)
Philadelphia 367 170 State,City General fund, Gate/concession
New Phillies stadium (MLB)
Phoenix 331 229 County Hotel/rental-car, Player income
New Cardinals stadium (NFL)
Pittsburgh 233 193 State,County,City Gate/concession, General fund
PNC Park (MLB)
Pittsburgh 244 177 State,County General fund, Sales
New Steelers stadium (NFL)
San Antonio 175 147 County Hotel/rental-car
SBC Arena (NBA)
San Diego 411 296 City Hotel/rental-car, General fund
New Padres stadium (MLB)
Seattle 430 323 County Sales, Gate/concession,
New Seahawks stadium (NFL) Hotel/rental-car, Lottery proceeds
* Facilities approved by January 1, 2001
Sources: Sports Facility Reports, ballparks.com, newspaper reports
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ENDNOTES
1 Benefits may also arise when high-paying jobs replace low-paying ones.
2 Impact studies usually attribute to the presence of a professional sports team
gross job creation due to all local spending by nonlocal residents who attend a
sports game. But some of this spending is likely to have occurred anyway, as many
of the nonlocal residents who attend a game may be visiting the metro area for
other reasons (e.g., to visit family or for business).
3 Equivalently, local multiplier jobs can be thought of as implying that total
net job creation will be some multiple of observable jobs created less unobserved
jobs lost.
4 Many impact studies also claim large benefits from the actual construction
jobs associated with building stadiums. But such jobs are unlikely to produce large
metro area benefits. Except in the depths of a recession, any very large construction
project must either hire workers from elsewhere who temporarily relocate into a
metro area or else hire local workers away from other local construction projects.
In both cases, wages for local construction workers should rise, which for them is
certainly a benefit. But the remaining residents of the metro area will temporarily
face higher costs for doing any construction. Even if the former benefit exceeds the
latter cost, the one-time nature of construction implies that any net benefit will be
small in magnitude (i.e., it is already on a net present value basis and so is not
scaled up as is the permanent job creation annual benefit).
5 The ambiguity of whether a metro area benefits from net job creation sharply
contrasts with the common perception that local net job creation is a benefit in and
of itself. The perception is easy to understand given that net job creation usually
reflects beneficial underlying metro area fundamentals. For instance, Denver has
seen explosive employment and population growth during the late 1990s. Many
firms and individuals cite the natural beauty and recreational opportunities afforded
by the nearby Rocky Mountains as key reasons for choosing to locate in Denver. It
is this natural beauty and recreational opportunity which benefit Denver’s residents,
both long-time and newly arrived. The job growth just reflects such benefits.
6 To the extent that such statistical techniques fail to control for underlying
fundamentals that cause simultaneous increases in jobs, wages, and property val-
ues, they will overestimate the benefits associated with increases in employment.
For instance, statistical analysis will tend to attribute Denver’s rapidly rising wages
and house values to its explosive population and employment growth. But as
argued in note 5 above, probably the growth of all three should be attributed to
individuals’ increasing desire to enjoy the natural beauty and recreational opportu-
nities afforded by the nearby Rocky Mountains. Rappaport (2000) shows how an
increase in either quality of life or productivity lends to simultaneous changes in
population, employment, wages, and home values.
7 A second way that increased sales tax revenue benefits a host metro area is if
it is due to local residents’ spending a greater proportion of their entertainment dol-
lars within the host metro area rather than elsewhere. For example, in the absence
of a local professional sports team, local sports fans may travel to other metro areas
to watch games. If their total expenditures on entertainment are to remain
unchanged, such fans will end up spending less in their home metro area and hence
contribute less to local sales tax revenue. By spending money in other tax jurisdic-
tions, these fans are exporting sales tax revenue. From the perspective of local resi-
dents, the recovery of exported sales tax revenue by the shifting of their spending
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from outside to a home tax jurisdiction is definitely a benefit. After all, if they are
going to pay sales taxes, they should prefer to do so to their own local government
rather than the local government of someone else. Local residents nevertheless
implicitly may choose to export tax revenue if the things they wish to purchase are
not available locally (or if they are more expensive locally). For local sports fans,
hosting a team makes available locally something they formerly had to travel to
purchase. However, it is not actually clear that hosting a professional sports team
recovers exported sales tax revenue. No good estimates exist on the magnitude of
exported sales tax revenues due to a metro area’s not hosting a professional sports
team. In addition, it is possible that host metro area fans’ traveling to attend away
games of their home team may export as much sales tax revenue as is recovered by
fans’ not traveling to attend “home” games in the absence of a local team.
Hosting a professional sports team may also increase local sales tax revenue if
local residents’ spending on admissions and concessions at sports games is subject
to higher than average sales taxes. However, any such increase in local tax revenue
represents a cost rather than a benefit to the host metro area. To see this, consider
that the host metro area could also increase its sales tax revenue simply by raising
the sales tax rates which apply to all local spending (with the caveat that the
higher rates are not more than offset by lower spending). Local residents’ willing-
ness to pay the higher local sales tax on stadium admissions and concessions shows
that they perceive an attached benefit (that such taxes support the presence of a
sports team). But all else equal, locally residing fans should certainly prefer not to
be taxed at a higher than average rate.
8 Of course, depending on particular circumstances, visits by non-MSA fans
may vary tremendously. For instance, a study of fans attending Baltimore Orioles
games in 1992 concluded that 46 percent were from outside the Baltimore metro
area and 31 percent were from outside the state of Maryland. A likely factor con-
tributing to such a high percentage of nonlocal fans is Baltimore’s location less
than a one-hour drive from Washington D.C., a metro area that lacks a baseball
team. In addition, 1992 was the first year the Orioles played in the new Camden
Yards stadium which also might have contributed to above-average nonlocal atten-
dance (Hamilton and Kahn). 
9 However, any revenue due to such visitors’ spending at games being taxed at
higher than average rates does count as a benefit attributable to hosting a sports team.
10 On the other hand, 5 percent is not an uncommon state sales tax rate. But
for states, imported tax revenue accrues only from visits by out-of-state sports fans,
which is likely to be a smaller percentage than for non-metro sports fans. 
11 To the extent that any increased income tax revenue from net job creation
does exceed the marginal cost of providing any associated increased municipal
services, the resulting benefit is largely what underlies the explanation of how net
job creation benefits a metro area’s existing residents. To include it again as an
imported income tax benefit would be to double count. Hence Table 5 excludes
assistant coaches along with the approximately 100 people team organizations
employ in “front office” positions, for instance managing business operations, sell-
ing advertising, and maintaining physical facilities. 
12 Using a 5 percent interest rate instead implies that each dollar of annual
benefits is worth $15.37. Using a 7 percent interest rate implies that each dollar of
annual benefits is worth $12.41.
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13 This aggregate quality-of-life benefit is known as “consumer surplus.” Esti-
mates of consumer surplus from major league game attendance range from $2 mil-
lion to $54 million per team per year (Alexander et al, Irani).
14 On the other hand, many economists argue that people overestimate their
willingness to pay for things when answering surveys (Diamond and Hausman).
15 Population inflows drawn to high quality of life may also result in large-scale
job creation. The straightforward intuition is that firms desire to locate where they
can affordably hire good workers. High quality of life is commonly cited as a reason
for rapid job growth in a number of U.S. states including Arizona, California, Col-
orado, Florida, and Nevada. Looking across U.S. counties at the relationship
between weather and 1990 employment levels, statistical analysis suggests that a
one degree Celsius higher mean January temperature is associated with a 3 percent
increase in employment. For a medium-sized metro area with 2 million residents,
such an increase is more than 30 times the size of even the most optimistic estimates
of the observable job creation from hosting a professional sports team.
Because all else is not equal, metro areas with high quality of life may be
observed to have high rather than low average wages. First, individuals who can
earn a high income regardless of where they live may be more likely to choose to
do so in high quality-of-life metro areas. Hence, measuring the effect of metro area
attributes on metro area wages requires taking account of individual-specific char-
acteristics such as education and occupation. Second, attributes that contribute
positively to a metro area’s quality of life may also contribute positively to its pro-
ductivity and so raise wages. For instance, location on an ocean coast provides both
recreational opportunities and access to low-cost seaborne transport (Rappaport
and Sachs). Indeed, the unobservable job creation due to high quality of life may
itself be a source of high productivity by bringing external economies of scale to a
metro area’s firms.
16 More specifically, individuals’ wages are regressed on individual-specific
characteristics and metro area characteristics. Negative coefficients on the metro
area characteristics measure positive contributions to quality of life. House prices
are regressed on house-specific characteristics and metro area characteristics. Posi-
tive coefficients on the metro area characteristics measure positive contributions to
quality of life.
17 In addition, two relatively small Canadian metro areas, Quebec and Win-
nipeg, lost NHL teams in the mid-1990s.
18 It could also be that the metro areas revised upward their estimates of the
job creation and tax revenue benefits. But this seems unlikely given economists’
unanimous inability to find evidence of any large such benefits.
19 Additional incentives were later added to lure the NFL Rams in 1995.
20 Los Angeles, as well, committed to a $100 million public outlay in a bid to
win an NFL expansion team that was awarded in 1999. Given the large quantity
and variety of alternative entertainment venues in the Los Angeles metro area
(e.g., four major league teams, two top college athletic programs, four major
amusement/theme parks, beaches, nearby mountains), it is not surprising that the
quality-of-life benefits from hosting an additional team may be lower to Los Ange-
les than they are to other metro areas.
21 One reason that Kansas City and San Diego may not have done so is that
both cities already host both an MLB and an NFL team. As was argued above with
regard to the NHL Pittsburgh Penguins, the additional quality-of-life benefit from
a third team may be much smaller than the benefit from a first or second team. In
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addition, both of the departing NBA teams had losing records in the several seasons
prior to leaving, which also may have lowered their contributions to quality of life.
22 A conceptually different question is whether metro areas would be better
off if all public contributions to the building of sports stadiums were prohibited.
On the one hand, the competition among metro areas for sports teams transfers
benefits from metro area residents to team owners and players. On the other hand,
competition for teams should cause the teams to locate in metro areas where total
benefits will be greatest.
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